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 “In NATO we don’t suffer from too much 
America; we suffer from not enough Europe” 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, April 29, 20031 
“Mighty Europe remains a military pygmy” 
Lord George Robertson, NATO General Secretary 
 
Introduction 
 
The Iraq crisis has not only threatened the transatlantic ties but also produced intra-
European divisions which have cast doubts over the future CSFP and ESDP of the EU. 
France and Germany were aligned against the United States in the UN-Security Council and 
both temporarily blocked the provision of surveillance and missile-defence assets to Turkey. 
Paris even warned that it might block the accession of pro-US East European countries to 
the EU if they did not align their foreign and security policies closer with those of the major 
EU powers (such as France). When Paris and Berlin were declaring that war in Iraq should 
be avoided at all costs, the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Hungary and Poland as well the retired Czech president Vaclav Havel declared to support 
the US. A week later, 10 another Central and Eastern European governments supported 
their positions in public — at a time, when the EU will expand from 15 to 25 members next 
year, growing in population by more than 20 percent. Ultimately, both sides did not fulfil their 
obligation to consult with their EU partners before taking up sharply opposing positions. 
Thus one the main political questions today is whether the public and government 
splintering of Europe into pro- and anti-U.S. camps will last beyond the present Iraq-conflict 
and cause long-term impacts on the future transatlantic relationship. Thereby, the 
transatlantic relationship is threatened by unilateralists on both sides. In Europe, 
unilateralists calling for a CSFP and ESDP independent from the US and NATO, whereas in 
the U.S.-administration, hardliners and unilateralists view a geopolitically powerful EU as a 
threat and competitor to fundamental US national interests. Hardliners and unilateralists in 
Washington might indeed look to exploit the current splits by nurturing relations with EU 
states like Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Denmark, as well as with candidate countries such 
as Poland and others. 
On the more positive side, in January 2003 the EU took over from the UN the 
international police-mission in Bosnia-Herzogovina and in April the Operation Concordia from 
                                                          
1 Quoted following Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 30 April 2003 (Internet-version). 
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NATO in Macedonia as the first two operations in the framework of ESDP. Meanwhile, the 
EU has intervened in Congo by carrying out the first EU military operation (“Operation 
Artemis”) outside the European continent. It was able to bring about a UN decision and 
select a lead nation (France) within a short period of time. A multinational command was in 
charge of strategy and action on site. The success of Artemis shows that the EU has at least 
a small genuine military operational capacity limited to 1,400 troops at its present disposal 
albeit it should not be overestimated. 
Looking ahead, the treaty of Nice in 2000 finally entered into force in March 2003 with 10 
countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta and Cyprus. They are expected to become full members in 2004. 
The deep intra-European split among the European countries has at least one 
positive notion: the enlarged EU needs to clarify for itself and as well as for the outside world 
what role it will and should play and what relationship it will develop with the United States, 
particularly in regard to NATO. Germany has to recognize by aligning and supporting French 
positions which are often not its originals ones that it marginalizes itself within the EU 
because the positions of France in regard to ESDP as a counterweight to the U.S. had and 
will never get a majority in an expanded EU. With other words, Germany and its positions 
vis-à-vis the EU’s CSFP and ESDP are a very critical factor for its outcome. In this light, I will 
analyse the present main challenges for the future ESDP.  
 
Present Challenges of the ESDP 
 
“Too easily, Europe’s hard security responsibilities have been evaded in the name of 
peace and soft power. To often, economic priorities have not been fully grasped in the 
interest of systemic stability due to inward-looking absorption with budget deficits and 
protectionist expectations. A convincing political language is needed to free Europe of 
shallow populism, insistence on corporatist harmony and ‘protest` foreign policy.”2 
 
It is fair to remark that Europe’s absence from the debate on Iraq for many years and 
its inadequate defence spending as well as the lack of a real Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have 
strengthened US unilateralism in the last years. 12 years after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 
which declared the initiation of the CFSP, and four years after the Helsinki Declaration of the 
EU in 1999, calling for a ESDP and the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO, both 
policies are still incoherent and considerably underfunded at a time when NATO’s and the 
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EU’s extension to the east is already underway and when both organizations are being 
preoccupied with those extension policies and its related problems. As a result, under the 
roof of NATO as a multilateral security and defence organization, a European and 
transatlantic re-bilateralisation of foreign, security and defence policies is underway due to 
US unilateral tendencies and the European lack as well as unwillingness to implement a real 
CFSP and ESDP and to recognize global security responsibilities. 
Basically, the EU and the ESDP are facing four major challenges in the next years:  
1) Residual French resistance to integration structures that Paris is unable to control 
sufficiently: Paris seems still to believe that the French-German axis of the 1990s is the 
real and only motor for EU integration which it effectively controls. But objectively this is 
no longer the case, particularly not in the context of the enlargement processes. 
Symptomatically for the French ESDP dilemmas, France cooperated with Britain much 
better than with Germany on ESDP and concrete defence cooperation projects during the 
last two years because it became increasingly disappointed about Germany’s ESDP 
commitments. Germany on its side has strengthened its bilateral defence cooperation with 
Britain despite the fundamental disagreements in regard to the US military intervention in 
Iraq because Berlin needs London’s support for NATO to play a greater role in 
Afghanistan, where Berlin co-leads the ISAF peacekeeping operation. 
2) Establishing an independent European military headquarter and command structures 
outside NATO: The EU defence initiative of France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium 
on April 29 this year to set up an independent military headquarter is in many ways typical 
for the European political symbolism rather than substance (having more significant 
military capabilities). Moreover, the proposal came to the wrong time because Berlin and 
others were in the process of repairing their relationship with Washington. When the allies 
agreed to the creation of a ESDP at a North Atlantic council meeting in Berlin in June, 
1996, they tied the ESDP into NATO by strengthening the European pillar within NATO. 
The new organization was defined as “separable but not separate” and would not only 
take action when NATO at large decided that it did not intend to do so as a whole. 
Although later in 1999 (see Table 1 of the “Helsinki Headline Goals”) a European military 
committee and staff were established, their duties are restricted to give mainly technical 
advice to the European Council and to liaise with any operational activity (see Table 2). 
Realistically speaking, for the time being, no significant European military operation can 
take place without prior NATO agreement to use the alliance’s assets such as command, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 IISS (Ed.), ’Strategic Survey 2002/3. An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs’ (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), here p. 115.  
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control, communication, computer and intelligence systems (C4I) and logistical 
capabilities. However, it is this restriction why the four European member states have 
taken action to establish a separate command chain on April 29 that would no longer be 
under NATO’s ultimate control.  
 
Table 1: Helsinki Headline Goals 1999 
1. By the year 2003, co-operating voluntarily, EU Member States will be able to deploy 
rapidly and then sustain forces, capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks as set 
out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to Corps 
level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000/60,000 persons). 
2. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this 
to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high 
readiness. They must be able to sustain such deployment for at least one year. 
3. These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control 
and intelligence capabilities, logistics other combat support services and additionally, as 
appropriate, air and naval elements. 
4. Such EU-led Crisis Management Operations are envisaged with or without recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities and with eventual contributions from other countries. 
Collective defence remains a matter for NATO. 
 
 
Table 2: European Council in Nice December 2000 - New Structures 
 
Establishment of new permanent political and military bodies within the European Council: 
■ Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC): linchpin of the European security and 
defence policy (ESDP) and of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The PSC has 
a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU response to a crisis. 
■ European Union Military Committee (EUMC): composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) 
repre-sented by their military representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC meets at the level of 
CHODs as nec-essary. This committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to 
the PSC, as well as providing military direction to the European Union Military Staff. 
■ European Union Military Staff (EUMS): the source of EU military expertise. It assures the 
link between the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU and provides military 
expertise to EU bodies as directed by the EUMC. It performs “early warning, situation 
assessment, and strategic planning for the Petersburg tasks including identification of 
European national and multinational forces“ and implementation fo policies and decisions as 
directed by the EUMC. The EUMS also contributes to the process of elaboration, 
assessment, and review of the capability goals; and it monitors, assesses, and makes 
recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made available to the EU by the 
member states on training, exercises, and interoperability. 
Source: Kori N. Schake, “Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?“, in: Strategic Forum (INSS/NDU), No. 
184, August 2001, p.3. 
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But characteristically of the past ESDP initiatives and the ever growing gap between 
official declarations and the implementation programmes, all four EU countries made no 
initiative for offering the necessary resources for combat, support and logistical personnel 
and equipment which will come at much greater costs. Hence the argument of the 
proponents that it would strengthen the European pillar of NATO lacks any credibility (except 
on paper).  
 
 
Table 3: Seven-Point Implementation Plan of the Mini Defence Summit (Belgium,  
France, Germany and Luxembourg) on April 29, 2003: 
 
• Formation of an embryonic joint rapid reaction force built around the existing Franco-German 
EuroCorps, Belgian commandos and Luxembourg recce units; 
• Formation of a joint planning and operations centre intended to support missions in conjunction 
with or independent of NATO. This unit would be operational by next year;  
• Formation of a general staff to conduct joint operations in theatre;  
• Creation of a European strategic air command, to be operational by June 2004; 
• Creation of a joint NBC defence capability; 
• Creation of joint training centres and harmonization of training methods;  
• Formation of an emergency humanitarian aid system (EU-FAST) capable of deployment on 24 
hours´ notice. 
 
 
Table 4: EU Forces Pledges of November 2000 
 
At the November 2000 EU Capabilities Commitment Conference, member states committed 
to 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships, including the following numbers of ground 
forces: 
 
Germany 13.500 Austria 2.000 
United Kingdom 12.500 Finland 2.000 
France 12.000 Sweden 1.500 
Italy   6.000 Belgium 1.000 
Spain   6.000 Ireland 1.000 
Netherlands   5.000 Portugal 1.000 
Greece   3.500 Luxembourg    100 
Source: Assembly of WEU, “Implementation of the Nice Summit Decisions in the Operational Area of the 
European Security and Defense Policy“, Document A/1734, Appendix I, available on: www.asemblee-
ueo.org/en/documents – here following: Kori N. Schake: Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten 
NATO?, in: Strategic Forum (INSS/NDU), No. 184, August 2001, S.4.  
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Even initiatives to improve efficiency in the mid- and long-term perspective by pooling 
capabilities, rationalizing force structures and combining national headquarters will be 
insufficient to reach the declared goals by the four EU countries. In this light, the German 
foreign and defence ministries have internally warned the Chancellor’s office to support those 
proposals of France, Belgium and Luxemburg. They have also tried to persuade the 
chancellor to limit the powers of the planned Tervuren military headquarter just to planning – 
but not leading – future EU crisis management operations.3 Symptomatically for the lack of 
crucial capabilities, the EU had to sign last March a landmark political agreement with NATO 
to share classified information and to give the EU access to the alliance’s logistical and 
planning capacities.4 
 
Table 5: Proposals for the Final Draft of the EU-Constitution at the EU-Summit in 
Thessalonika (Greece) on June 19-20, 2003: 
• Guarantees of mutual defence and assistance. 
• Expansion of the so-called Petersberg tasks to permit the EU to commit military and civil 
resources for more extensive peacekeeping and crisis management missions. 
• Creation of a joint defence procurement agency (already included in a draft released by 
the convention last week). 
• Creation of a defence and security college.  
 
Furthermore, by duplicating NATO assets without giving substance by any additional 
financial commitments, NATO’s integrated military command structure — on which the ability 
to fight in close multinational coalitions — might be damaged. This integrated military 
command structure of NATO guarantees five important functions: 
• long-term planning to give visibility into defence spending, procurement, and force 
structuring plans; 
• operational planning to piece together national forces into coalitions for specific 
contangencies;  
• advising political leaders about using force; 
• training to agreed standards to ensure reliable knowledge on the availability and 
performance of forces 
• building common understanding about using force and a degree of comfort in each 
others` judgments through routine interaction among militaries.5 
                                                          
3 See FAZ-Sonntagszeitung, 31.8.2003, S. 4. 
4 See IHT, 15-16 March 2003, p. 2. 
5 See Kori N. Schake, “Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?“, in: Strategic Forum 
(INSS/NDU), No. 184, August 2001, p.3. 
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3) Insufficient preparedness of European publics for active global foreign and security 
policies that the EU need to play in its own strategic interests, and with the US and its 
unilateral tendencies: These insufficiencies have been highlighted before and during 
the US military intervention in Iraq when European government policies were often 
different from the public opinion. However, Germany is nowadays willing to send 
troops abroad to participate “in military operations in defence of freedom and human 
rights”. German troops had been deployed in Kosovo, with air forces participating at 
the first combat mission of the German armed forces after World War II in 1999. More 
recently, it has sent the first combat deployment of ground troops to Afghanistan 
where Special Forces of the German Bundeswehr (“Kommando Spezialkräfte/KSK”) 
were and are involved in Operation Enduring and others. It plays a lead role in ISAF 
in Kabul and assumed naval command of a task force operating off the Horn of Africa 
in May 2002 and has provided medical teams, logistical support, and five transport 
aircraft for the EU military mission in Congo. These are important steps forward in the 
right direction not just for Germany but for the EU as a whole. However, there is not 
really a public debate in Germany and most other EU members about the military 
instrument in the framework of CSFP and the directions of CSFP/ESDP in general 
themselves and in regard to global security challenges and commitments in particular. 
 Nonetheless, in its first-ever global “security strategy”, presented by Javier Solana, 
High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), and 
meanwhile confirmed by the heads of state and government of the EU at the 
European Council in Thessaloniki on June 19-20, 2003, the EU has now recognized 
and confirmed new global security threats (i.e. international terrorism and proliferation 
of mass destruction weapons). It brings the EU’s security concerns broadly in line 
with that of the United States. This highly important document is serving as the basis 
for a officially declared European Security Strategy to be adopted by the European 
Council in December 2003. The new strategy is explicitly calling for extending the 
zone of security around Europe and to develop strategic partnerships not just with the 
United States, Canada and Japan, but also with China and India due to their 
important security role “in their respective regions and beyond”. In another new key 
document, the Declaration of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the 
EU has outlined its key policy objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CSFP) as well as its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), “to deter, halt 
and, where possible, reverse proliferation programs of concern worldwide.” For the 
very first time, it does no longer exclude the use of force as a last resort and the most 
extreme coercive measure if political and diplomatic measures have failed. In this 
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regard, the EU is developing and implementing an EU Action Plan as a matter of 
priority. Furthermore, in another declaration concerning the ambivalent nature of 
Iran’s civilian nuclear program, it is not only warning Teheran to develop and acquire 
nuclear weapons, for the very first time, the EU is even threatening Iran to suspend its 
economic trade and cooperation programmes. Although I see these documents as 
very important and positive guidelines for the future CSFP/ESDP, the EU needs to 
debate openly those foreign, security and defence policies in public in order to bolster 
its legitimacy and understanding. 
4) Taking over hard-security responsibilities as an integral element of ESDP: The 
massive gap in military capabilities between the continent and the United States is 
well-documented. European defence spending with 140 billion Euros is less than half 
of the United States. A lack of military muscle as the EU’s geopolitical Achilles heel 
certainly limits Europe’s ability to project power as part of an security concept to 
guarantee regional and global order. The transatlantic capability gap not only 
concerns the US in the framework of NATO, but also France which sees Europe as 
its platform for military legitimacy. Since the beginning of the 1990s in the aftermath of 
the second Gulf-war, a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has taken place. It is 
driven particularly by the US and its particular interaction of its Pentagon planners, its 
military/industrial complex and high technology. With a massive investment in new, 
precision weaponry, supported by detection, reconnaissance and command, control, 
communication, computer and information systems (C4I), Washington hopes to be 
successful in any wars without taking heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s 
budget is equal to the combined military budgets of the next 12-15 countries – 
accounting for 40-45 percent of all the defence spending of the world’s 189 states. 
The USA is currently consuming the equivalent of the UK’s annual defence budget 
every 37 days and of France’s every 25 days.6 The Pentagon’s research and 
development budget alone may be even as much as 70-80 percent of all the global 
defence-related R&D7, outpacing not just Germany’s entire defence budget, but also 
the entire NATO R&D investment budget.  
 
The war in Afghanistan and the fight against international terrorism is no longer based 
primarily on a process of state-controlled violence that emerged centuries ago. But hitherto, 
only the United Kingdom has really addressed the new security challenges by developing 
                                                          
6 See Edward Foster et. al., ‘How to Make Friends and Influence People‘, Jane’s Defence Weekly (JDW), 11 
September 2002, pp. 24-33 (33). 
7 See also Paul Kennedy, Financial Times, 3 September 2002, p. 12. 
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new adequate force structures based on “network-centric” capabilities, whereas all other 
European NATO and EU members beginning just to analyse and develop those capabilities 
— not to speak about implementing them. But there is still not a real organised effort to 
transform the European armed forces for the new missions or to exploit the technologies that 
are at the heart of the RMA.  
Table 6: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Die Welt, 29 July 2002, p. 5. 
 
This is in particular a problem for Germany (spending 1.4 on defence in percentage of 
its GDP compared with France of 2,5 and Grat Britain of 2.3) and some other old EU 
member states which are accused for free riding on the common European defence and 
which is hardly a positive signal to poorer NATO and EU member states to live up to their 
multilateralist commitments (see Table 6).In this light, NATO and France have urged all 
NATO and EU members to commit to investing at least 2.0 percent of GDP on their defence 
budgets. But it also concerns the new NATO and members which appear to confirm NATO’s 
worst fears: that these countries are keen to join the NATO club for historical and political 
reasons, but, once safely integrated in the Western alliance structures, are unwilling to pay 
the membership fees and to live up to their newly acquired obligations. Just the last thing 
NATO and EU needs is a bunch of another free riders. 
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However, the September 11 events have challenged many underlying traditional 
assumptions of the Pentagon’s contingency planning and its related R&D investment. 
Furthermore, the Iraq conflict illustrated not only the superiority of modern technology 
and network-centric warfare capabilities and other modern technologies but also the 
advantages of professional forces over conscript armies. But although the EU defence 
ministers declared on May 19 this year the “operational” capability of the EU’s military 
apparatus across the “full range” of humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks 
according to the Helsinki meeting in 1999, the actual ability to deploy a 60,000-strong Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF) remains “limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls” as the EU 
defence ministers admitted on May 19. The limitations affect deployment time and high risks 
“at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when conducting 
concurrent operations”. In other words, the EU’s RRF is unable to engage in sizable 
operations in terms of numbers of firepower, and cannot safely sustain more than one limited 
operation at a time. 
Table 7: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, here following: Wall Street Journal Europe, February 13, 2003, p. 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, here following: Wall Street Journal Europe, February 13, 2003, p.10 
 
The number of shortfalls of the European Capability Action Plan has reduced the 
major shortfalls just from 42 to 26 since 2001. Accordingly, the EU defence ministers 
established last May nine new project groups to reduce the gaps in (1) air-to-air refuelling; (2) 
combat search-and-rescue; (3) multinational headquarters; (4) nuclear, biological and 
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chemical defence, (5) theatre ballistic missile defence, (6) unmanned air vehicles, (7) 
strategic airlift; (8) space-based assets and (9) humanitarian rescue procedures.8 But without 
raising the European defence budgets and changing the unbalance between personnel costs 
and material investments at the expense of modern military equipment in their defence 
budgets (see Table 7), it won’t be likely to close most of those critical gaps in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Summary and Perspectives 
 
The recent crisis in transatlantic relations is shattering both NATO and the EU’s 
ambitions for CSFP and ESDP as the result of U.S. unilateral tendencies combined with 
toothless and self-defeating tendencies for a too far-reaching European autonomy in security 
policies. The Iraq war exploded the myth that Europe was prepared to speak with one voice 
on issues touching European security. Germany and France became painfully aware of the 
fact that not only the East European EU candidate states are hesitating to follow their 
bilateral leadership in the EU’s CSFP and ESDP, but also some of the older members such 
as Spain, Italy and Great Britain naturally. There are clear dividing lines as to how much 
sovereignty they are willing to yield to supranational structures of the EU in Brussels and how 
independent the ESDP should become from the U.S. and NATO. 
Against this background, Europe and the EU are at a major crossroads in their future 
evolution to become a unified political and economic body, with sufficient power projection 
capabilities to cope with the new global security challenges and to maintain operability with 
the US armed forces in its own strategic interest. By expanding from 15 to 25 members, the 
EU might been strengthened on paper, but not necessarily becoming more meaningful 
because integration is not just a technical, but also a sensitive political and psychological 
process. The only realistic EU security and defence identity is for political, military as well as 
financial reasons in the foreseeable future a ESDP within the framework of NATO. A 
European security and defence identity in opposition to the United States has no future and 
contradicts the EU’s own long-term security interests in an increasing globalised world. 
Hence the recent British counterproposal (entitled “Food for Thought”) to the idea of setting 
up an independent military headquarter by the “Gang for Four” (France, Germany, Belgium 
and Luxembourg) to create a European “planning cell” based in NATO’s military headquarter 
seems much more realistic than an unnecessary duplication without real substance at this 
                                                          
8 See Luke Hill, ’EU Force Declared Operational but Capability Shortfalls Remain’, in: JDW, 28 May 2003, p. 
3. 
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crucial time. Even the idea of having both, a European “planning cell” within NATO as well as 
an independent military headquarter outside NATO is only becoming realistic when the 
European “planning cell” within NATO, and therewith the transatlantic alliance, will be given 
priority in decision-making of European security policies. 
But at the same time, the Bush administration needs to recognise that a united 
Europe with a CSFP and ESDP that is strengthening the European pillar within NATO does 
not contradict US national security interests and should, therefore, not seen as a global 
competitor and strategic rival, but as the closest strategic ally in the future too. Against this 
background, both sides of the Atlantic need to change their present policies and unilateral 
strategies vis-à-vis the other transatlantic partner and going back to their agreement of 1996 
when they tied the ESDP into NATO by strengthening the European pillar within the Western 
alliance. 
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